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This study addresses the transformation of the South Korean developmental state since
the early 1990s in relation to globalization and neoliberal restructuring. First, several
key analytical-concepts are discussed for the study. Next, we examine two recent civil-
ian-governments’ major policies that have accelerated the transformation. Then, we
spell out the changes of three major institutional actors in the developmental-state
framework, i.e., the state, banks, and chaebols, which have resulted from the aforemen-
tioned conditions and policies. In conclusion, we argue that an alternative path should
be followed instead of the current path of neoliberal transformation in South Korea to
achieve a form of substantively-democratic development.
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INTRODUCTION
In the development-study literature, South Korea’s case has been consid-
ered as a developmental-state model, which is characterized by state-
bureaucracy’s active role in economic growth and industrial transformation.
During the high growth period of the 1960s—1970s, the Korean state played
such a role using several institutional or practical tools, such as policy loans
(Woo, 1991) and strategic industrial policy (Chang, 1994). The state insulat-
ed itself from the particularistic interests of the private sector (in particular,
big business), but cooperated with it in purposeful ways (Evans, 1995). In
the course, family-owned, large and diversified business groups called chae-
bol have grown up in the economy as gigantic growth-machines resulting in
the transformation of even the developmental state itself until the 1980s
(Kim, 1997). Since the early 1980s, such a model emphasizing the state’s
industry-promoting role was even been recommended by ‘revisionist’ schol-
ars as an alternative way for economic development in developing coun-
tries, which is distinguished from both a neoclassical free-market model and
a radical de-linking path (Johnson, 1980; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1991).
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
Volume 35  Number 1, June 2006, pp. 1~28
However since the 1997 financial crisis in Asia and South Korea, there
have been discussions questioning the effectiveness of the developmental-
state model in the current era of ‘globalization’. In addition, neoliberal
changes in the Korean economy since then poses a more fundamental ques-
tion: “does the developmental state still function or exist in South Korea?”
Reform measures domestically implemented in the country with the IMF’s
bail-out funding have accelerated the dismantling process of the old “Korea
Inc.”, which was characterized by the “state-banks-chaebols nexus” (Shin &
Chang, 2003).
In addition to gradual transformations of the developmental state under
military governments since the early 1980s, recent civilian governments’ key
policy-drives were ironically critical to such neoliberal changes in the coun-
try. For example, the Kim Young Sam government (Feb. 1993 — Feb. 1998)
mismanaged its globalization drive (domestically known as “segyehwa”)
finally to the economic meltdown in late 1997, and the Kim Dae Jung gov-
ernment (Feb. 1998 — Feb. 2003) implemented neoliberal reforms under
IMF guidance after the crisis so intensively, that it accelerated the transfor-
mation of the country’ economy by inserting it deeply into global turbo-cap-
italism.
This study attempts to examine the transformation of the Korean devel-
opmental-state in relation to two conditional factors: ‘globalization’ and
‘restructuring’. Our focus is more or less limited to the changes concerning
three major institutional actors of “Korea Inc.”: the state, banks, and
chaebols.1 We intend to show how globalization and restructuring have
largely weakened and dismantled major characteristics of the Korean devel-
opmental-state since the early 1990s and note that outcomes of the transfor-
mation, i.e., the deeper global integration and neoliberal changes of the
economy, make the re-vitalizing of the old model of developmental state
difficult. The relationship between this transformation of the Korean state
and ‘democracy’ is also scrutinized as our main concern.
What follows is, first, the theoretical and analytical discussion dealing
with the developmental state in relation to globalization and restructuring.
Second, the trajectory of globalization efforts and restructuring policies in
South Korea’s recent history is described. Then, the neoliberal transforma-
tion of the Korean developmental state will be examined focusing on three
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1 This study is focused mainly on the three actors in the transformation of the Korean devel-
opmental state as an institutional configuration of the economy. As for the studies of other
actors in the configuration and the social results of the transformation, such as labor flexibility
and changes in class structure, see Lim, Hwang & Chung (2000); Lim (2002); Lim &
Han(2003); Kim (2004); Chang & Chae (2004); and Park (2004).
major institutional actors. In conclusion, some implications of this study
regarding the issues of state transformation and democracy will be
addressed.
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
Developmental-State Theory
In discussions of economic development, there have been several compet-
ing theoretical paradigms.2 In the case of East Asia, with the region’s
impressive growth over the past decades, two explanatory paradigms have
been most prominent. One is the paradigm of orthodox/neoclassical eco-
nomics, which mostly has been presented by economists in academia or
international financial institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank
(Balassa, 1978; Krueger, 1990; 1997). This line of explanation emphasizes the
primary role of free trade and export-oriented industrialization in the Asian
economic ‘miracle’ as well as the superiority of free-market principles while
being critical of ‘price-distorting’ state intervention and bureaucratic ‘rent-
seeking’. The neoclassical paradigm was influential in refuting Latin
American dependency theory’s argument of underdevelopment in develop-
ing countries as the result of their linkage to the capitalist world-economy.
In this way, East Asian high-growth economies became the examples for
legitimizing such neoclassical arguments.
But since the early 1980s, there has been another line of explanation of
East Asian development, which emphasizes the state’s active role in the
economy, and this has opposed the neoclassical explanation preoccupied
with the free-market mechanisms of development in the area. At first,
researchers with the new explanatory perspective were called ‘revisionists’
because they were different from ‘orthodox’ economists in their understand-
ing of development mechanisms, and now their theoretical paradigm is
named a ‘developmental-state theory’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999). Besides such
efforts to explain economic development, the renewal of concern in state
theory from a neo-Marxian paradigm to a neo-Weberian one during the
early 1980s also contributed to the rise of this developmental-state approach
elaborating theoretical concepts such as ‘state autonomy’ or ‘state capacity’
(Evans et al., 1985; Cho, 1997).
The seminal work in this new paradigm was Chalmers Johnson’s study of
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2 Regarding competing paradigms in development theory, see Nederveen Pieterse (2001).
As the explanatory frameworks of economic development, both neoclassical economics and
developmental-state theory have been salient since the 1980s.
the Japanese economic bureaucracy, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), and industrial policy formulated and implemented by the
ministry, and this study focused on the bureaucracy’s role in Japan’s rise as
an economic giant during the post-1945 era (Johnson, 1982).3 Johnson
attempts to explain the state bureaucracy’s active and strategic role in
Japan’s economic development, whose origin dates back to the 1930-1940s
when similar bureaucratic activities were designed and adopted to effective-
ly mobilize industrial resources for war-time purposes. He constructs the
Japanese case as a different economic model from both the American system
and the Soviet one. According to his typology, the Japanese model is ‘plan-
rational’ (developmental state) while the American model ‘market-rational’
(regulatory state) and the Soviet one ‘plan-ideological’. And he focuses his
discussion mainly on the differences between the market-rational and the
plan-rational economic models (Johnson, 1982: 18-26). His early construc-
tion of the ideal-types of different capitalist-systems seems to be a precedent
for a ‘typology of capitalisms’, which has become increasingly popular in
the current post-Cold War context (cf. Albert, 1993; Dore, 2000; Hall &
Soskice, 2001).4
Since Johnson’s work on the Japanese case, there have come out several
works focused on other East Asian cases, such as South Korea and Taiwan.
Amsden (1989) pays attention to efficient state-bureaucracy’s role in South
Korea’s technological learning and industrial transformation from its war-
torn condition of the 1950s into another economic giant of the region. She
attributes this transformation to the state’s “deliberately getting relative
prices wrong” mechanism for achieving a long-term development goal.
Wade (1990) suggested a ‘governed-market theory’ (GMT) in his analysis of
Taiwan’s (and Korea’s) industrialization, which was also intended to refute
a neoclassical ‘free-market theory’ (FMT) or a ‘simulated-market theory’
(SMT) of economic development.
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3 After criticizing previous explanations of the post-1945 Japanese economic miracle, such as
“projectionist”, “national character”, “no-miracle-occurred”, “unique-structural-features”,
and “free-ride” analyses, Johnson presents his own approach as “the school that stresses the
role of the developmental state in the economic miracle” (Johnson, 1982: 6-17). As for detailed
explanations of the developmental state, see Cumings (1999) and Beeson (2004) on the
genealogical issue, Chang (2002) on state theory, and also Bagchi (2000) on the historical cases.
4 Economic historian Gerschenkron’s study on diverse paths to industrialization in
European history set an earlier precedent for the typology of capitalisms because he denied
the historical generality of the English case in industrialization and considered it even as an
exception (Gerschenkron, 1962). Theorists in the developmental-state school including
Johnson (1982) and Amsden (1989) depend largely on Gerschenkron’s discussions. See also
Shin & Chang (2003).
Regarding Again the case of South Korea’s postwar economic develop-
ment, Woo (1991) examined the important role of ‘state-controlled’ finance,
while Chang’s (1994) study focused on the role of industrial policy in the
country. In a study on the development of the information technology sector
in several states including South Korea, Evans (1995) constructed three
ideal-types of the state in terms of its developmental functioning, such as
‘developmental’, ‘predatory’, and ‘intermediate’ states. He emphasized that
state bureaucracy should be not only ‘embedded’ in the private sector, but
also ‘autonomous’ of its particularistic interests in order to achieve domesti-
cally-based industrial transformation and further economic development.5
In this line of study, Eun Mee Kim (1997) also examined a trajectory of the
relationship between the state and big business (chaebol) changing from
state-dominance (“comprehensive” developmental state) until the 1970s to
symbiosis (“limited” developmental state) between the two actors in
Korea’s recent history.
Meanwhile, Weiss (1998) considered not only East Asian states but also
Germany to be cases of the developmental state, emphasizing strengths
both in Japan and Germany as ‘dualist states’ which are distributive as well
as developmental, while indicating weaknesses in the industrial transforma-
tion of the Swedish welfare-state as the ‘distributive state’. Conceptualizing
the government-business relationship in East Asia as ‘governed interdepen-
dence’ and opposing an ‘authoritarianism thesis’ of the developmental state
by defining state power as ‘infrastructural’ rather than ‘coercive’, Weiss
maintained that even under the pressure of globalization which is popularly
assumed to have weakened the nation-state’s capacity for intervening in the
economy, state capacity as an institutional complex is still important for
competitiveness. Recently, Chibber (2002) developed a detailed explanation
of ‘intra-bureaucracy dynamics’ in his comparative study of India and
South Korea suggesting an irony that bureaucratic mechanisms based on
the logic of ‘rationality’ can weaken the ‘state capacity of cohesiveness’ as
seen in the Indian case, which is in contrast to the developmental state in
Korea. 
And in such discussions of the South Korean case, three key institutional
actors and their inter-relationship are prominent in workings of the Korean
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5 Evans considers South Korea as the developmental state, Zaire as the predatory one, and
both Brazil and India as intermediate ones. Most studies of the developmental state (cf. Kim
1997) including his work are focused mainly on the relationship between the state’s adminis-
trative apparatuses and the business sector. But Evans also suggests the possibility of the
developmental-state based on the state’s cooperative relationship with non-business sectors
like labor as seen in the case of Austria (Evans, 1995: 240-243).
developmental-state, that is, the Korean economic model is noted to have
been “based on a close collaboration between the state, banks, and the chae-
bols, with the state as the dominant player” (Shin & Chang, 2003: 1).
While the developmental-state theory suggests as a condition for econom-
ic development specific institutional arrangements and the state’s activities
that have been adopted in some countries, there is a critique that the sug-
gestion may ignore the world-systemic or ‘geopolitical’ context if it tries to
generalize the cases in an ahistorical manner (Johnson, 1999: 55; Pempel,
1999: 174-180; Woo-Cumings, 1999: 21).6 This critique is legitimate insofar as
it pays attention to the developmental state as a ‘historically-conditioned’
outcome and its transformation according to changes in such conditions. In
this study, ‘globalization’ and ‘restructuring’ are discerned as two important
conditional-factors that have influenced the weakening or dismantling of
the Korean developmental state since the 1990s.
Globalization and Restructuring
As a buzzword in the social sciences, ‘globalization’ has been discussed in
many ways and from different perspectives. There are two types of global-
ization: one from above and the other from below (cf. Mittelman, 2000: 205).
In response to ‘globalization-from-above’ driven by states and transnational
actors including IFIs, TNCs, or global finance, there has emerged ‘globaliza-
tion-from-below’ to reclaim the power that the former have usurped on
planetary and local scales. Globalization-from-above can be called ‘neoliber-
al globalization’ because it accelerates the integration of individual coun-
tries into a single global economy by empowering transnational ‘market’
players and undermining states’ autonomy in domestic policy-making
domains. Globalization-from-below can be considered ‘civil-society global-
ization’ that mobilizes social movements by non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) across national boundaries (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).
Regarding the transformation of the developmental state in South Korea,
our study focuses on neoliberal globalization.7 As noted, neoliberal global-
ization is oriented toward the deeper integration of individual countries
into the capitalist world-economy, which in fact has been promoted by
‘restructuring’ within each country in the process of regime transition (e.g.,
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6 On the one side, Johnson (1982) did not take the external factors seriously in his early
work, and on the other, works based on world-systemic analyses often seem to accept the
hegemonic determinism of development. In between, Wade (1990: 346) recognizes the partial
importance of international situation in the workings of a specific developmental state. 
7 As for critical analyses of neoliberal globalization, see Martin & Schumann (1997), Petras &
Veltmeyer (2001), and Bello (2002).
post-Socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) or
post-crisis structural adjustment.
‘Restructuring’ here refers to neoliberal structural reforms aimed at trans-
forming the institutional framework of the economy. Its standard form rec-
ommended or mandated by IFIs such as the IMF and the World Bank is a set
of structural adjustment programs (SAPs).8 According to one study (Nelson,
1990), the structural adjustment programs can be distinguished between
two types, while the boundaries between the two are often blurred in real-
world cases: first, short-run ‘stabilization’ (reduction of an aggregate
demand) of one or two years through macroeconomic management, such as
devaluating currency, slowing down inflation, and reducing balance-of-pay-
ment deficits, and second, medium-term ‘structural change’ (encouraging
foreign-exchange earning or saving activities, trade liberalization, price
deregulation, and tax reform) of three to five years.
And there are two ways of making such structural adjustments. ‘Ortho-
dox’ adjustment programs attempt to achieve a fast transition, at the
expense of low growth and high inequality, by tightening government bud-
gets, downsizing public sectors, and loosening labor-protective laws.
Meanwhile, ‘unorthodox’ or ‘heterodox’ adjustment programs prefer a slow
transition, pursuing high growth and better equality simultaneously by
investing in production as well as spending in welfare, having the risk of
conflicting with foreign creditors. Noting the importance of ‘political-regime
type’ in economic adjustments, some researchers assume that heterodox
efforts are more likely to be implemented by more democratic or less
authoritarian regimes due to their responsiveness to supporting political
bases. In fact, however, the links between regime type and the adopted way
of adjustments are often loose (cf. Kaufman & Stallings, 1989; Nelson, 1990:
334).
The two formulae of orthodox and heterodox programs have their own
transitional costs. The orthodox programs tend to create severe social con-
flicts and political cleavages due to austerity measures, low growth, and
high unemployment. According to mainstream discussions, the heterodox
programs often fail to stabilize the economy and re-create economic crisis by
not fixing structural deficiency for fear of the side effects of restructuring.
Among the developing countries that have completed regime transition
from authoritarianism or Socialism, some may have compounding obstacles
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1986, 1990; Nelson, 1989, 1990; Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Williamson, 1990, 1994). As for a
critical analysis of the negative effects of SAPs in developing countries, see Chossudovsky
(1996).
originating from such social conflicts and political cleavages. In turn, a lack
of ‘democratic governance’ is said to usually entail barriers to developing a
long-term perspective on structural adjustments, since new democracies
cannot solve the problem of distributing economic costs to cross the “transi-
tion valley” (Przeworski, 1991).
In fact, there have been more failures than successes in the developing
countries that have undergone SAPs (Chossudovsky, 1996). Having critical-
ly evaluated empirical studies on the performances of these programs in dif-
ferent countries, Dasgupta (1998: 378) concludes that “there is no evidence
that structural adjustment works”. Indeed, almost all of the developing
countries under restructuring imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions
have shown a low degree of growth, often with denationalization of capital
accumulation, growth without distribution, increased unemployment, and
even worsened foreign indebtedness.
Which Democracy?
The last two decades have witnessed the collapse of various authoritarian
or Socialist regimes in Latin America, Asia, and Southern and Eastern
Europe. What is significant in this recent democratization is that new
democracies have been influenced, or (re-) shaped to a large extent by glob-
alization and restructuring geared to establishing the free market on a
world-economic scale. Globalization mediated and facilitated by restructuring
affects the ups and downs of democracy in individual countries since
restructuring constitutes a specific logic of capitalist accumulation which
(re-)shapes not only relations of production, but also modes of domination
at both local and global levels.
Indeed, the IMF’s neoliberal structural adjustment packages are designed
to seek the deeper integration of the economy of developing countries into
the capitalist world-system through trade liberalization and the removal of
all barriers to the cross-border flows of capital, goods and services, with the
extended role of the market and the re-oriented role of the state. In many
developing countries, globalization and restructuring have had mixed
results at best, or even disastrous ones in terms of democratic achievement
and economic advance (Haggard, 1992; Smith & Korzeniewicz, 1997). It may
be the case because globalization and restructuring exacerbate both interna-
tional and domestic disparities resulting in the minority of winners and the
majority of losers.
In most post-transitional countries, thus, democratic consolidation has
been unable to go beyond a transition from authoritarianism in the midst of
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growing disparities and inequalities. Globalization brings about the spread
of democratic ideals in those countries, but often without corresponding
democratic practices or institutionalization. In addition, what globalization
promotes is in reality a specific type of democracy, which can be considered
‘free-market democracy’, giving priority to the free flows of capital, goods
and services across country-borders to lead accumulations on a world scale.
In the course, the democratic ideas of participation and equality and the
free-market rationales of competition and efficiency clash with each other,
and the latter usually dominate over the former (cf. Centeno, 1997; Singh,
1999: 143-5; Abrahamsen, 2000; Teivainen, 2002). Under the command of
globalization and restructuring, even economic advance is often hindered
because of increasing social cleavages and political tensions. Over the long
run, these are detrimental to the sustainability of democracy.
Regarding the developmental state, globalization and restructuring func-
tion as transformative forces. Neoliberal globalization constrains the state’s
capacity to implement developmental tools such as industrial policy, while
restructuring requires the re-orientation of the state’s role and functions in
order to incorporate the domestic economy deeply into global capitalism.
This in turn weakens the state’s autonomy and capacity in policy implemen-
tation from both inside and outside. In this way, globalization and restruc-
turing tend to re-direct the state’s role and functions in the economy in line
with neoliberal ideals currently called the “global standards”, which are in
fact based on the Anglo-American economic model (Soederberg, 2004).
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FIGURE. 1. TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT STATE IN SOUTH KOREA
Figure 1 suggests the analytical frame to examine the transformation of
the Korean developmental-state over the last decade, which has been condi-
tioned by the Kim Yong-Sam government’s segyehwa (globalization) drive in
the mid-1990s and the Kim Dae-Jung government’s neoliberal reforms
(restructuring) since the 1997 financial crisis. 
KOREA’S SEGYEHWA DRIVE AND NEOLIBERAL REFORMS
In South Korea, the notion of globalization has been popularized with its
domestically translated term “segyehwa”. Thus, globalization was consid-
ered mainly a national development strategy by the Kim Young-Sam gov-
ernment, which was the first civilian government in South Korea since the
early 1960s. After coming into power, Kim Young-Sam suggested a bold
idea of building a “New Korea” (shin han’guk) to cure the so-called “Korean
disease” supposedly inherited from authoritarianism of the past. No won-
der his globalization (i.e., segyehwa) drive was the product of this “New
Korea” policy. For him, segyehwa signified a new vision for Korea in the
twenty-first century with an upgraded status and role in the international
theater. It was a self-claimed hallmark for his administration.
It is observed that the globalization drive developed through a two-stage
conceptualization: first, kukjehwa (internationalization) in May 1994, and
later, segyehwa in November 1994. Internationalization was defined by the
Foreign Minister as “an inevitable process which every nation must under-
go to ensure sustained stability and prosperity” by “trying to induce foreign
investment, liberalizing its financial market and preparing to join the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)” (Gills &
Gills, 2000: 36-37). Yet, segyehwa as a national development policy, as the
government claimed, “entails rationalizing all aspects of life” and “reforms
in every area”. It meant “a sweeping transformation of society” requiring
“productivity and flexibility” (Gills & Gills, 2000: 38). Segyehwa was publi-
cized as a necessity for South Korea to flourish. This could be found in one
of Kim Young-Sam’s speeches:
Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-class
country in the 21st century. This is why I revealed my plan for globaliza-
tion […] It is aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors — politics, for-
eign affairs, economy, society, education, culture and sports. To this end,
it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and
practices to the world class level […] We have no choice other than this
(Korea Times, January 7, 1995)
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In his segyehwa drive, Kim Young Sam launched a series of reforms in
almost every area including military, politics, economy, finance, labor, edu-
cation, law, and welfare. He might have thought that segyehwa was a
panacea to cure irregularities and malpractices inherited from the past.
Without clearly recognizing the potential risks inherent in globalization, he
approached it mainly as a national development strategy. Kim Young-Sam’s
segyehwa drive, in fact, reflected both hasty financial liberalization since the
early 1990s and the globalization of production by Korean chaebols around
the time (E. M. Kim, 2000; Shin & Chang, 2003: 76-9). Such financial liberal-
ization was the combined outcome of the Kim Young-Sam government’s
attempt to seek South Korea’s OECD membership and the bilateral US-
Korea Financial Policy Discussion Talks during the early 1990s, making the
blueprint for the schedule of financial liberalization and market opening in
the country (cf. Sakong, 1993: 182, 200; Kwon, 2004: 82-4). Meanwhile, a
study draws attention to the relation between the domestic drive and the
creation of the World Trading Organization (WTO) in 1995 after closing the
ten year-long Uruguay Round talks (Moon, 2000: 127). Due to the result of
the talks, the Kim Young-Sam government had to accept a large-scale mar-
ket opening for agricultural products reversing its previous promise to
Korean farmers which was made during the 1992 presidential campaigns.
Segyehwa was able to be used as a justification for this reversal.
In the end, Kim Young-Sam’s segyehwa drive turned out to be a dismal
failure with the financial crisis in 1997. What Kim Young-Sam envisaged in
his talks of a “first-class country” was to become a member of the OECD.
Yet, the country did not have enough time to be prepared for sudden and
profound changes in the rules of the game required for gaining OECD
membership until 1996. After the 1997 crisis, Kim Young-Sam’s rosy picture
based on his ambitious segyehwa drive became a humiliation for the country
by having to go through restructuring under the IMF’s supervision.
The Kim Young-Sam government did not hesitate to push financial liber-
alization and capital-market opening along with a series of deregulations
for international capital flows, even though some in the policy-circles were
aware of and concerned about dangers in such segyehwa measures that
would undermine state capacity in managing the economy. Without consid-
erate safeguards for the economy, however, the segyehwa drive paved the
way for financial meltdown in the region-wide crisis of 1997. At the end of
his single five-year presidency, thus, Kim Young-Sam had to ask for a $57
billion emergency bail-out from the IMF against national default in the
wake of plummeting currency-value and the rapid exhaustion of dollar
reserves.
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With the financial bail-out arranged by the IMF, accompanying package
programs which were intended for not only stabilization but also radical
restructuring of the domestic economy included the shutdown of insolvent
financial institutions, the termination of bank loans to financially distressed
firms, the furthering of trade and capital-account liberalization, the estab-
lishment of the flexible labor-market, and improvement in transparency and
the debt-to-equity ratio in the corporate sector. The IMF also demanded
government budget-cut, higher interest rates, and reduced growth.9
The Kim Dae-Jung government, thus, from its inception had an urgent
task of coping with the crisis situation. When Kim Dae-Jung, a long-time
opposition party leader, was elected as the president in December 1997, the
country was on the brink of default with a shortage of foreign exchange
reserves. His solution to the crisis was to follow, with little reservation, the
neoliberal reforms demanded by the IMF as the rescue condition, retreating
from his earlier stance of being critical of its conditionalities (Gills & Gills,
2000: 45). This free market reform proceeded under the slogan of “Parallel
Development of Democracy and Market Economy”.10 It is not clear, howev-
er, how the post-crisis administration conceived it could deal with inherent
conflicts and tensions between democratic ideals like participation or equal-
ity and market rationales like competition or efficiency. In Kim Dae-Jung’s
published vision of the “mass-participatory economy”, of course, such prob-
lems as social disparities and external dependence associated with global-
ization and intensive restructuring could not be foretold (Kim, 1996). There
is an analysis indicating that Kim Dae-Jung’s early version of the ‘mass par-
ticipatory economy’ having a social-democratic tone was transformed into
the neoliberal version of “DJnomics” in 1998, and that many of problems in
post-1997 restructuring can be found in such a change (Lee, 2001). The Kim
administration-related scholars, however, would note that DJnomics was
rather German social market-styled ‘order liberalism’ or a Third Way ver-
sion than neoliberalism, because of its welfarist elements. Retrospectively, it
cannot be denied that the ‘real outcomes’ of DJnomics were not so much dif-
ferent from those of neoliberalism.
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9 These demands were later moderated or in part withdrawn in severely-worsening eco-
nomic conditions and credit crunch in 1998 resulting from the implementation of those pro-
grams, and in the fear of global economic meltdown after the Russian default, the Brazilian
crisis and the near-bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in New York of
the same year (cf. Stiglitz, 2002: Ch. 4; Shin & Chang, 2003: 64-65).
10 “Productive welfare” was later added to it, which may be related to ‘active labor market’
in Scandinavian countries (Kim, 2003: 317). It aimed at improving living standards by incor-
porating the unemployed into the labor market through re-education and re-skilling. Apart
from the statement of intention, its real outcomes seem to have been rather limited.
During the Kim Young-Sam government, the economy had declined on
the whole, culminating in the currency crisis of 1997. The Kim Dae-Jung
government had hardships to overcome the post-crisis economic downturn.
South Korea increased foreign exchange reserves due to trade surplus short-
ly after the crisis. The trade surplus between 1998 and 1999 after many years
of deficit, however, was mostly owing to decreased imports rather than
increased exports.11 The Kim Dae-Jung government incurred a huge amount
of public debts in the process of recapitalization of the troubled financial
sector and corporate restructuring. The privately-incurred debts in the cor-
porate and financial sectors were socialized in the course, which was in fact
characteristic of the cases of post-crisis restructuring in Asia (Singh, 1999:
97).
The Kim Dae-Jung government thus had to become a crisis-management
government from the beginning. The administration attempted to complete
structural adjustments in a short period, even with a goal of achieving
growth and distribution simultaneously. Using a distinction between two
ways of structural adjustments mentioned earlier, the goal of structural
adjustments in post-1997 South Korea sounded more like a ‘heterodox’ way,
but the way in which structural adjustment programs were in reality imple-
mented in the country was rather an ‘orthodox’ one. It was not only due to
the government’s expectation and hope for fast economic recovery.
Regardless of the goal of the government, the IMF’s programs as the condi-
tionalities attached to its financial rescue largely determined ways of imple-
menting structural adjustments in the domestic economy with little room
for heterodoxy.
Indeed, the assumption that the way of structural adjustments (orthodox,
or heterodox) depends on the type of domestic political regime (non-democ-
ratic, or democratic) seems to be irrelevant in the Korean case, because the
Kim Dae-Jung government was considered to be democratic inside and out-
side the country. The way of adjustments adopted by the government may
reflect more the degree of both economic troubles and domestic vulnerabili-
ty to external demands or pressures than its political regime-type.
International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF usually have pre-
ferred an orthodox way of structural adjustments in financially-troubled
countries so far. Such a distinction between the two ways of adjustments
seems to be only for a speculative purpose.
BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY 13
11 The country’s trade condition recently worsened as the import unit price skyrocketed
while the export unit price fell. The terms-of-trade index of commodity between 1995 and
2002 decreased each year as follows: 138.5 (1995), 125.4 (1996), 122.2 (1997), 116.7 (1998), 114.1
(1999), 100.0 (2000), 95.5 (2001), 95.0 (2002) (BOK).
In sum, a misconceived segyehwa drive in the mid-1990s was followed by
wholesale neoliberal reforms in South Korea after the 1997 financial crisis.
The neoliberal or “market-oriented” reforms consisted of orthodox structur-
al-adjustment programs towards further financial and trade liberalization,
labor-market flexibility and public sector privatization with financial recapi-
talization and corporate reorganization.12 Such restructuring was consid-
ered by domestic policy-makers to strengthen national competitiveness by
extending the transnational linkages of the domestic economy.
It is also noted that South Korea’s post-crisis reforms included the neo-
corporatist elements of social partnership between labor, management, and
government when the Labor-Management-Government Tripartite
Commission (LMGTC) was established in January 1998.13 In addition, the
Kim Dae-Jung government took some welfare measures, such as increasing
‘social-safety nets’, or promoting the venture industry in the so-called “New
Economy” sector. The neo-corporatist arrangements, however, ran into a
setback due to labor’s dissatisfaction about the government’s restructuring
programs leading to massive lay-offs and labor flexibility, and the ‘produc-
tive welfare’ proved to be ineffective in reducing unemployment and
inequality increased by restructuring measures.
The IT venture firms after all were unable to become business substitutes
for chaebols in the large Korean economy, while highly welcomed foreign
investment was focused mostly on often speculative portfolio investment
(FPI) in domestic company stocks (Hankyoreh 21, September 24, 2004;
Ellwood, 2001: 76; Hong, 2004: 316). In post-crisis Korea, speculative fea-
tures in foreign investment were salient as seen in the pattern-like cases of
buying local assets at discount prices in the wake of restructuring for selling
with high returns in recovery.14 The speculative nature is also obvious in the
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12 A moderate form of neoliberal reforms in Korea dates back to the partial efforts of stabi-
lization in the early 1980s after skyrocketing inflation caused by several factors including the
second oil shock and political instability. Throughout the 1980s, liberalization was implement-
ed in various areas such as the financial sector or trade, which included the privatization of
government-held shares in nationwide commercial banks between 1981 and 1983 (Woo, 1991:
Cf. 7; Sakong, 1993: 66-93).
13 Koo (2001:44) opposes some argument that the state corporatism of a Latin American or
European style existed in Korea during the period of industrialization. If we accept his under-
standing, the establishment of the LMGTC in 1998 was the first attempt of corporatism in
Korea. But the aftermath of the institutional arrangement was full of tensions and conflicts
among major participants, and it often became more a way of labor control than that of con-
sensus building in the wake of restructuring and downsizing.
14 Even former IMF deputy secretary Stanley Fisher gave an alarm in May 2004 when he vis-
ited Korea for attending an Asian Development Bank conference indicating that the current
presence of foreign capital in South Korea was mostly speculative and unproductive for the
case of foreigners’ investment in local real estate. It is reported that when
the profitability target was met, which had been set before their investment,
they soon sold the real-estate assets and left the country without hesitation.
Moreover, the large part of funds for their recent investment in Korean real
estate was domestically mobilized (Hankyoreh, November 12, 2003).
STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION
As noted earlier, the main institutional-framework of the developmental
state in Korea was “the state-banks-chaebols nexus” (Shin & Chang, 2003).
The state’s active role in industrial transformation by developmental plan-
ning, policy-financing to the business sector through government-controlled
banks, and the business sector ’s venture into new industrial projects
through state coordination or initiatives were major features of the model.
In this section, we discuss post-1997 changes and characteristics in these
three actors.
State
In addition to limited financial liberalization of the 1980s, which increased
the number of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) including insurance
or securities firms, further financial liberalization since 1993 made the insti-
tutional framework largely unravel. With the ownership of NBFIs, chaebols
were able to increase their financial independence and power vis-a-vis the
state during the 1980s, though they were still unable to have the full owner-
ship of commercial banks by legal restrictions. During the 1990s, the Kim
Young-Sam government increased the number of merchant banks
(chongkŭmsa) from six to thirty between 1994 and 1996, and allowed banks
and chaebols to freely borrow money or make investments abroad without
the appropriate monitoring system.15 Such enactments made the state
unable to financially control chaebols, causing their excessive overseas bor-
rowings and uncoordinated investments, which were later to be blamed as
‘moral hazards’. Financial liberalization of the 1990s also went side by side
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economy. Thus, he emphasized inducing foreign capital with a long-term business plan in
Korea. But it is ironic that such speculative outcomes had been associated with structural
transformations accelerated by the IMF-demanded neoliberal reforms. In fact, IFIs such as the
IMF and the World Bank have invested in FPI-oriented global finance capital (“Inside Story of
Lone Star Fund,” Monthly Chosun, May 2004).
15 Regarding the domestic and external causes of financial liberalization in South Korea in
the 1990s, see Lee et al. (2000) for the role of chaebols, and Kwon (2004) for external pressures
by such actors as the US, the IMF and the OECD.
with the globalization of production by chaebols, which also made the state’s
intervention in the corporate sector more difficult (E. M. Kim, 2000).
With the segyehwa drive, the Kim Young-Sam government attempted to
implement reforms in the public sector as well. In its endeavors to downsize
government bureaucracy, several ministries of the central government were
merged. In this course, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was merged
into the Ministry of Finance, newly forming a mega-economic bureaucracy
named the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in 1994, which was a
historical incident considering EPB’s decades-long role in the development
planning of the country. This resulted in a power monopoly by MOFE elimi-
nating checks and balances among economic bureaucracies, and finally led
to its irresponsible behaviors for the months before the crisis of 1997 (cf.
Kang, 2000: 92-3; Thurbon, 2003).
With intensified financial liberalization between 1993 and 1997, chaebols
and financial institutions including merchant banks were largely out of state
control. The state itself became irresponsible in the wake of ‘organizational
reshuffling’ driven by hasty government downsizing of the segyehwa drive.
Combined together, these institutional changes led to the domestic financial
crisis with chaebols and financial institutions’ heavy short-term foreign bor-
rowings and the rejection of debt roll-over by foreign banks in the regional
contagion of the crisis during 1997.
Under the crisis-ridden conditions after 1997, the Kim Dae-Jung govern-
ment made the final blows with the IMF’s adjustment programs against the
developmental state that had been already being dismantled since the 1980s
in a stop and go fashion. With the goal of reforms in four main sectors,
namely, the financial, corporate, labor and public sectors, the government in
some ways imposed strict reform-standards and measures on those sectors.
Newly introduced ‘post-crisis regulatory rules’ such as the Bank for
International Settlement (BIS)’s capital adequacy standard and the forward-
looking criteria (FLC) in the financial sector, and the requirement for drasti-
cally reducing the debt-to-equity ratio in the corporate sector within a short
period of time accelerated the rapid withdrawal of capital by local financial
institutions from the corporate sector. It created a vicious cycle of credit
crunch, massive bankruptcies of small- and medium-sized firms, and addi-
tional non-performing loans (NPLs) in the financial sector. To meet the new
financial regulations, industrial investments were contracted, and compa-
nies in need of capital had to sell their brightest assets at bargain prices to
mostly foreigners who were the only buyers with enough capital for pur-
chasing those assets in such a situation (cf. Han & Chang, 2003).
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Banks and Transnational Shareholders
Meanwhile, domestic banks increasingly pursuing profit-maximization
after the crisis have been addicted to lending for household consumption or
to rich clients, and corporate financing is less of a priority, thus transforming
the pre-crisis problem of corporate debts into the post-crisis problem of
household debts (Table 1). Big businesses also have come to prefer equity-
financing through the stock market to debt-financing through banks for
their operation reducing their dependence on banks which was typical in
the old Korean model (Table 2).
In this way, the stock market has become more important than ever in the
working of the whole economy. Since the ceiling of company stock owner-
ship by foreigners was lifted according to post-crisis reforms in May 1998,
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TABLE 1. TRENDS IN LENDING PATTERNS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS (TRILLION WON)
Late 1997 Late 2000 Late 2001 Late 2002 Late 2003
Household lending 48.1 90.3 133.0 189.2 214.7
(32.6%) (39.9%) (49.1%) (52.9%) (52.9%)
Corporate lending 95.5 131.0 132.2 162.8 184.5
(64.5%) (56.5%) (48.9%) (45.5%) (45.5%)
Source: Hankyoreh 21 (9 December 2004).
Note: The percentage in a parenthesis is that of lending made by the domestic currency. 
TABLE 2. EXTERNAL FINANCING OF THE CORPORATE SECTOR (BILLION WON)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total 118,769 118,022 27,664 51,755 66,531 51,939
Indirect Financing 33,231 43,375 -15,862 2,198 11,391 1,185
From Banks 16,676 15,184 259 15,525 23,348 3,381
From NBFIs 16,555 28,191 -16,550 -13,267 -11,997 -2,377
Direct Financing 56,097 44,087 49,496 24,792 18,996 36,838
CPs 20,737 4,421 -11,678 -16,116 -1,133 4,210
Stocks 12,981 8,974 13,515 41,137 20,806 16,504
CBs 21,213 27,460 45,907 -2,827 -2,108 11,761
Foreign Borrowing 12,383 6,563 -9,809 11,537 15,765 2,283
Others 17,059 23,997 3,839 13,228 20,380 11,633
Source: Shin & Chang (2003: 114)
Note: CP is corporate paper. CB is corporate bond. Others include corporate loans, government
loans and so on.
foreigners’ share-ownership in the domestic stock market has dramatically
increased. The majority shareholders in so-called ‘blue-chip’ companies and
major banks have become transnational institutional investors (TIIs).16
Among the biggest and best-known Korean companies with a significant
proportion of foreign-owned shares are POSCO (former Pohang Iron and
Steel), Samsung Electronics, SK and Hyundai Motor. The percentage of for-
eign-owned shares in those companies reached 67.3%, 59.5%, 54.1%, and
50.8% respectively in February 2004, which had been 20.8%, 24.2%, 13.7%,
and 23.6% in November 1997 (K. K. Lee 2004: 68). 
As Figure 2 shows, in terms of market capitalization, the ratio of foreign-
owned shares in the Korean stock market increased from 12.97% in 1996 to
40.02% in 2003, while domestic surplus money remains elsewhere, such as
in banks or real estate putatively due to the underdevelopment of domestic
institutional investors in the stock market (Hankyoreh 21, September 24,
2003; Hankyoreh, October 30, 2003).17
Free from traditional business relationship in the domestic economy, for-
eign investors tend to prefer high and fast returns on their investment based
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16 In 2003, the value of the stocks which foreigners hold in the ten largest chaebols was up to
44% of the whole stock price of the groups (Hankyoreh, October 8, 2003), which increased
almost up to 50% in April 2004. This change makes incumbent CEOs in chaebols increasingly
vulnerable to the possibility of hostile M&As, as was shown in the SK case in 2004. This condi-
tion has become one main reason of chaebols’ inside cash-holding for defending existing man-
agement against potential M&A attempts.
17 The most significant cause of such spectacular increase in foreigners’ stock-ownership
seems to be not only the underdevelopment of domestic institutional investors, but also the
decrease of the government-ownership in accelerated privatization of public enterprises since
1998. The government or public stock-ownership decreased from 19.72% in 1998 to 5.66% in
2002 (Hankyoreh 21, September 24, 2003).
FIGURE. 2. MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED STOCKS IN KSE, 1996-2003 (%)
Source: Korea Stock Exchange (Website).
mainly on a financial rationale.18 In this way, conservatism and profit-maxi-
mization in business for higher shareholder returns have replaced active
investment for new industrial ventures which was one of the main charac-
teristics in the past development framework, thus leading to structurally-
lowered economic growth. With such transnational investors who are cur-
rently dominant in the domestic stock market, but tend to cross massively
and freely national borders seeking higher returns, instability and fluctua-
tion in stock-price movement also have increased compared to the pre-1997
levels. The transnationalization of the Korean stock market with the sizable
presence of TIIs represents one of the most significant links between the
demise of the developmental state and the deeper global integration of the
domestic economy produced by neoliberal restructuring in South Korea
since 1998.
Chaebols
Disclosing ‘mission creep’ in Korea, the IMF even demanded changes in
the private corporate sector for the first time in its history, criticizing the
structure of chaebol-like ‘business grouping’ as the main cause of inefficien-
cy and moral hazards. Chaebols thus were forced to reform corporate struc-
tures and practices according to new regulations and standards. As an
exemplary punishment to disobedient cases, Daewoo, one of the top four
chaebols, was eventually dismantled in June 1999 with its abnormalities,
writing a new record of the biggest bankruptcy in a world business history
until then.
Being business latecomers in the global economy, chaebols are now losing
their old leverage, as affiliate firms which formerly belonged to the same
business groups while sharing and mobilizing scarce resources like capital,
technology and labor among them in new ventures at the group level, are
becoming independent companies by the post-crisis corporate reforms.19
Neoliberal policy-makers and opinion-shapers in Korea, who pushed chae-
bols for such reforms, were obsessed with their idealized version of ‘efficient
corporate governance’ based on the ‘global standards’ (i.e., the Anglo-
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18 Regarding ‘financialization’ in corporate governance, see Dore (2000), Lazonick & O’Sulli-
van (2000), Fligstein (2001), and Crotty (2003).
19 Hyundai’s entry into shipbuilding industry and Samsung’s foray into semiconductor
industry in the past were the successful examples, which were possible by such leverage (cf.
Amsden, 1989: Ch. 11; Kim, 1997: 65-77). Samsung’s venture into the car industry, however,
was a negative case, which occurred when the state’s industrial coordinating role was largely
dismantled in the 1990s (Wade, 1990: 311; Shin & Chang, 2003: 38). In the corporate restructur-
ing process, public attention has been paid mainly to the negative cases.
American corporate model) that they did not see that their model might be
different from real-world cases, as seen in the recent US case of Enron’s
bankruptcy. 
In corporate management of ‘blue-chip’ companies, such as investment
decision or profit distribution, CEOs now should pay more attention to their
shareholders, whose majorities have become transnational institutional
investors since 1998. Under the pressure of recently popularized sharehold-
er-value ideology in the country, CEOs have come to see growth in their
companies’ stock prices or in dividends to shareholders as a business priori-
ty. Such changes in attitude and practice among CEOs expectedly have
exacerbated labor downsizing and job instability in South Korea in recent
years, as witnessed in ‘actually-existing’ neoliberal economies (cf. Lazonick
& O’Sullivan, 2002 for a critical analysis; Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein & Shin,
2005 for a critical view of the US case). With neoliberal reforms and more
global integration, not only the pattern of business investment, but also that
of employment seen in the past developmental-state has currently been
transformed in this way (Table 3).
The reforms toward transnationalization in share-ownership and finan-
cialization in corporate control and structure have constrained resource
mobilization for new investments at the organizational level as mentioned
earlier.20 In fact, the contraction of investment in the economy has been
exacerbated since the 1997 crisis to the extent that the disparity between the
amount of liquidities companies hold and their low investment has come to
reach record levels in recent decades. It is the case even though their debt-
equity ratios currently have become low.21 According to one study, the ten-
dency in domestic business investment represents both a moderate fluctua-
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TABLE 3. RATIO OF REGULAR AND NON-REGULAR WORKERS, 1995-2003 %
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Regular Worker 58.14 56.81 54.33 53.14 48.45 47.87 49.15 48.39 50.4
Temporary Worker 27.89 29.60 31.60 32.87 33.60 34.49 34.60 34.45 34.7
Day Worker 13.97 13.59 15.07 13.99 17.64 17.64 16.24 17.16 14.9
Source: Shin (2003: 43).
20 Neoliberal emphasis on shareholders’ value combined with their demand for the larger
amount of stock dividends also can be considered one of the main causes constraining poten-
tial industrial investments. The percentage of stock dividends to investment in the facilities of
listed Korean companies has increased from 3.7 % in 1998 to 6.6% in 2000 to 22.4% in 2002
(Hankyoreh 21, November 13, 2003).
21 The Ratios of Gross Domestic Investment during the last decade show the trend of drasti-
tion among big businesses and a large fall among SMEs, exacerbating polar-
ization between two groups in investment (Yoo 2004:81). It is plausible to
expect that the above changes in business environment have long-term con-
straining or negative effects on both groups’ industrial investment and R&D
spending in general. On the other hand, the ratio of stock dividend to
investment in the facilities of listed Korean companies also increased from
3.7% in 1998 to 6.6% in 2000, and to 22.4% in 2002 (Hankyoreh 21, November
13, 2003).
CONCLUSION
In addition to the globalization drive of the mid-1990s, neoliberal restruc-
turing since the 1997 financial crisis has accelerated financialization and
transnationalization in the South Korean economy, completing the demise
of the developmental state as of the present. In the course, the roles, func-
tions, and inter-relationship of three institutional actors, namely, the state,
banks, and chaebols, in the old developmental state have largely been trans-
formed.
First, compared with the developmental role in the past, the Korean state
has played the regulatory role of the neoliberal state in transforming the
domestic economic structure in an ‘investor-friendly’ way and integrating it
deeply into the global economy. Second, domestic banks, many of which
have become foreign-owned since 1998 and independent of the govern-
ment’s industrial concern over the whole economy, now do their business
exclusively according to the rationales of profit-maximization preferring the
rich as their clients and consumer financing as their major business area to
commoners and corporate financing.22 Third, chaebols are currently losing
their old structure of business groups as their affiliate firms become inde-
pendent, and they have become conservative in new investment depending
more on equity-financing than on debt-financing. 
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cally declining investment after reaching the peak in 1996: 35.4% (1993), 36.5% (1994), 37.3%
(1995), 38.1% (1996), 34.4% (1997), 21.3% (1998), 26.9% (1999), 28.3% (2000), 27.0% (2001),
26.1% (2002) (BOK).
22 For example, three of the eight largest nation-wide banks (Korea First bank, Korea
Exchange Bank, and Citibank Korea, that is, former KorAm Bank) have become foreign-
owned since the 1997 financial crisis. “Foreign banks now have a 21% chunk of the Korean
market, an Olympic leap from the 4 % share in 1997 and a dash from 15.5% in 2003” (Asia
Times, February 15, 2005). The proportion of foreign-owned shares in the other five banks is
on average over fifty percent (Hankyoreh, October, 10, 2004; April 15, 2005). For example, in
Kookmin Bank, the largest bank in South Korea, the proportion of foreign-held shares reached
75.4% in February 2004.
Transnational institutional investors’ presence and influence in domestic
financial and corporate sectors have spectacularly increased by owning the
significant amounts of stocks in the sectors and thus by affecting manage-
ment-decisions according to recently popular shareholder value ideology.
This transformation into shareholder-centered ‘corporate governance’ has
gone side by side with neoliberal labor-market reforms toward more labor
flexibility since 1998 (Chang & Chae, 2004; Kim, 2004). Borrowing Chalmers
Johnson (1982)’s analogy of MITI in Japan, TIIs, not state bureaucracy, now
have become the “commanding heights” of South Korea’s economy, turning
the state into a post-developmental one. The answer to whether or not the
developmental state in the country as the “state-banks-chaebols nexus” can
survive in the wake of globalization and neoliberal restructuring, thus,
seems to be negative as of the present with the transformation of major
institutional actors, their functions and the relationships among them.
Our discussion of the transformation of the Korean developmental-state
here has focused mainly on conditional factors like globalization and
restructuring since the 1990s, engaging above all external actors and the
state. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the growing power of domestic
non-state actors like the chaebol or labor vis-a-vis the state also has con-
tributed to such transformation (Evans, 1995; Kim, 1997). The “government-
banks-chaebols” nexus was an outcome of historical evolution, not some-
thing unchangeable. Thus, since it has often been argued that since state-
and chaebols-led development over the past decades in South Korea had
exclusive characteristics vis-à-vis domestic civil society (e.g., labor), the old
development-model should have been transformed at any rate. But it is true
that neoliberalism, which is currently prevalent as a historically transform-
ing force in post-crisis South Korea, cannot be a desirable alternative to the
old developmental-state for resolving its contradictions and problems.
While Weiss (1999) notes that the developmental state is not necessarily
based on coercive power, but rather on infrastructural one in the state, the
combination of the developmental state with military-authoritarian regimes
in Korea’s past history has made such a conceptual and analytical distinc-
tion difficult especially on the part of pro-democratic actors in civil society
(Lim, 1998: 421). In the eyes of the public, therefore, any attempt to trans-
form the old developmental state into a neoliberal state is often considered a
politically ‘democratic’ movement against the authoritarian past of the
country, because it appears to be a challenge to or a radical departure from
existing institutional arrangements (Kapur & Naim, 2005). This kind of
‘politics of confusion’ in neoliberalization recently has been criticized (cf.
Bourdieu, 1998; Nederveen Pieterse, 2005).
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An analysis defines the changing historical characteristics of the Korean
state as follows: (1) the “repressive” developmental-state in the pre-1987
period, (2) the “transitive” developmental-state between 1988 and 1997, and
(3) “democratic” developmental-state in the post-1998 period (Cho, 2003:
447). The characterization of the Korean state since 1998 as “democratic”
makes a critical examination of the issue of “which democracy?” more
important than before (cf. Song, 2003: 121; Abrahamsen, 2000). Another
analysis even suggests that there has been a change in the characteristics of
the Korean regime from being “pro-chaebol and anti-labor” until 1997 to
being “anti-chaebol and anti-labor” since then (Choi, 2002: 164-5).
Here exists a crucial dilemma. How should the progress of political
democracy deal with socio-economic neoliberalization? There is no doubt
that the state will become undemocratic as the problems of labor flexibility
and social inequality become exacerbated with ongoing neoliberal
reforms.23 Insofar as the ‘substantively-democratic’ state, a form of post-
developmental state in South Korea, is more desirable in the current chal-
lenges presented by globalization and neoliberal reforms, we should not
only pay attention to the drawbacks and dangers in both the old develop-
mental state and the new neoliberal one, but also be able to imagine new
ways of constructing “a national community with a kind of moral ambition”
(Loriaux, 1999: 252).
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Classes and Inequality in South Korea) Kyŏngje wa sahoe (Economy and Society) 59:
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